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Expected value theory has been known for centuries to be subject to critique by St. Petersburg 
paradox arguments. And there is a traditional rebuttal of the critique that denies the 
empirical relevance of the paradox because of its apparent dependence on existence of 
credible offers to pay unbounded sums of money. Neither critique nor rebuttal focus on the 
question with empirical relevance: Do people make choices in bounded St. Petersburg games 
that are consistent with expected value theory?  This paper reports an experiment that 
addresses that question.   
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1. Introduction 
The first theory of decision under risk, expected value maximization, was challenged long ago 
by the St. Petersburg paradox (Bernoulli, 1738). The original St. Petersburg lottery pays  
when a fair coin comes up heads for the first time on flip , an event with probability 1/ 2 . 
The expected value of this lottery is infinite:
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× = ∞∑ .  But Bernoulli famously 
reported that most people stated they would be unwilling to pay more than a small amount to 
play this game. He concluded that such reported preferences called into question the validity 
of expected value theory, and offered a theory with decreasing marginal utility of money as a 
replacement. 
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A traditional rebuttal of the alleged paradox is based on the observation that no agent 
can credibly offer the St. Petersburg lottery for another to play in a real payoff experiment – 
because it could result in a payout obligation exceeding any agent’s wealth – and therefore 
that this challenge to expected value theory has no bite. For example, if the maximum amount 
that a supplier of the game can credibly offer to pay is $3.3554×107 (= ) then the St. 
Petersburg lottery is a game that actually pays $ 2  if 
25$2
n 25n < , and $  for . The 
expected value of this game is only $26, so it would not be paradoxical if individuals stated 
they would be unwilling to pay large amounts to play the game.  
252 25n ≥
Arguments about the relevance of the St. Petersburg paradox are great sport, especially 
now that a generalized form of the paradox has been shown (by Cox and Sadiraj, 2008 and 
Rieger and Wang, 2006) to apply to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992), dual theory of expected utility theory (Yaari, 1987), rank dependent utility theory 
(Quiggin, 1993), and expected utility theory as well as expected value theory. But such 
arguments are not an answer to the original question: Does expected value theory have 
empirical validity? This question has previously been addressed by numerous empirical 
studies but, surprisingly, not by experiments involving St. Petersburg lotteries.  This paper 
reports an experiment with bounded St. Petersburg lotteries.  
 
2.  A Real Experiment with a Finite St. Petersburg Lottery 
The experiment was designed as follows. Subjects were offered the opportunity to decide 
whether to pay their own money to play nine finite St. Petersburg bets. One of each subject’s 
decisions was randomly selected for real money payoff.  Bet N had a maximum of N coin 
tosses and paid  euros if the first head occurred on toss number n , for  and paid 
nothing if no head occurred.  Bets were offered for N = 1,2, …,9.  Of course, the expected 
payoff from playing bet N was N euros. The price offered to a subject for playing bet N was 
2n 1,2,... ,n = N
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25 euro cents lower than N euros. An expected value maximizer would accept every one of 
these bets.  
  The experiment was run at the University of Magdeburg in February 2007. An 
English version of the subject instructions is contained in the appendix. Thirty subjects 
participated in this experiment: (a) 127 out of 270 (or 47%) of the subjects’ choices are 
inconsistent with risk neutrality; and (b) 26 out of 30 (or 87%) of the subjects made at least 
one choice inconsistent with risk neutrality. Is the failure rate of expected value theory 
statistically significant? 
 One way to pose the question is to ask which characterization of risk references is 
more consistent with the data: (a) risk neutrality; or (b) risk aversion sufficient to imply 
rejection of all offers to play the St. Petersburg games in the experiment?  First, the observed 
fraction of choices consistent with risk neutrality is [0.87, 0.87, 0.8, 0.63, 0.53, 0.43, 0.27, 0.2, 
0.17]  in St. Petersburg bets for N = 1,2, …, 9, respectively. Recall that expected values of the 
nine St. Petersburg bets are [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], respectively. So in the first 5 tasks more 
than half the subjects made choices that are consistent with expected value (EV) theory.  
However, as the stakes of the sure amount of money required for playing the St. Petersburg 
bets increase, and the variance of payoffs of the lotteries increase, subjects risk-averse choices 
start to dominate. From bets for N = 6 to 9, the fraction of choices violating EV theory 
increases from 57% to 83%.    
We apply a linear mixture model (Harless and Camerer, 1994) with stochastic 
preference specification for error rate ε : (a) if option Z is stochastically preferred then 
Prob(choose Z ) 1 ε= − ; and (b) if option Z  is not preferred then Prob(choose Z ) ε=
)
.   Let 
the letter a  denote a subject’s response that she accepts the offer to play a specific St. 
Petersburg bet in the experiment.  Let r  denote rejection of the offer to play the game.  The 
linear mixture model is used to address the specific question whether, for the nine St. 
Petersburg bets offered to the subjects, the response pattern (  or the , , , , , , , ,a a a a a a a a a
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response pattern  is more consistent with the data. With this specification, 
the log-likelihood is -182 and the estimate of the error rate is 0.29. The point estimate of the 
proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) 
is 0.48, and the Wald 90% confidence interval of this estimate is (0.30, 0.67). Allowing for a 
specification with two  error rates (one error rate for bets 1-4 and another error rate for bets 5-
9), the estimates of the error rates are 0.50 for the first four bets and 0.14 for the last five bets. 
The point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the experiment that are not risk neutral (or 
very slightly risk averse)  is 0.77, with Wald 90% confidence interval of (0.63, 0.91). The log-
likelihood is -164. Using data only for bets  4 - 9, that require payments in excess of 3 euros to 
accept, the error rate is 0.18 and the point estimate of the proportion of subjects in the 
experiment that are not risk neutral (or very slightly risk averse) is 0.71 with 90% confidence 
interval (0.56, 0.87). The log-likelihood is -103. We conclude that data from the St. 
Petersburg experiment are significantly inconsistent with expected value theory.  
( , , , , , , , , )r r r r r r r r r
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Endnote 
 * Glenn W. Harrison provided helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support was 
provided by the National Science Foundation (grant number IIS-0630805).  
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Subject Instructions 
Please write your identification code here:  
A coin is tossed no more than 9 times. Your payoff depends on the number of tosses until Head 
appears for the first time.  If Head appears for the first time on flip number N then you are paid 2N 
Euros.  Table 1 shows the possible outcomes: 
Table 1 
Head appears for the first time on coin toss Probability this will occur Your payoff in Euros 
1 0.5 2 
2 0.25 4 
3 0.125 8 
4 0.0625 16 
5 0.03125 32 
6 0.015625 64 
7 0.0078125 128 
8 0.0039062 256 
9 0.0019531 512 
Never  0 
 
There are a variety of different lotteries offered to you that differ in the maximum possible number of 
coin tosses and the amount you have to pay if you want to participate in the lottery. Table 2 shows this. 
Table 2 
Maximum number of tosses Participation fee in Euros I choose to pay to participate: Yes/No 
1 0.75  
2 1.75  
3 2.75  
4 3.75  
5 4.75  
6 5.75  
7 6.75  
8 7.75  
9 8.75  
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For example, if you decide to pay 3.75 Euros to participate in the lottery with a maximum of 4 tosses, 
the coin will be flipped 4 times. Your payoff is determined according to Table 1. If Head appears on 
the first toss then you will receive 2 Euros, regardless of the results of the further tosses. If Tail 
appears on the first toss and Head on the second, you will receive 4 Euros, regardless the results of the 
further tosses. If Tails appear on the first two tosses and then Head on the third toss, you will receive 8 
Euros, regardless of the further tosses. If Tails appear on the first three tosses, followed by Head on the 
fourth toss, you receive 16 Euros. If Head never appears your payoff is 0 Euro. 
 
Payoffs 
After you make your decisions, one of the rows will be selected by chance and your Yes or No 
decision in that row will become binding. The selection of the row is carried out by drawing a ball 
from a bingo cage containing balls with numbers 1,2, …, 9.  The number on the drawn ball determines 
the row of the table that is selected. 
If, for example, row 6 is selected for payoff then: (a) if your decision in row 6 is “No” then no money 
changes hands; (b) if your decision in row 6 is “Yes” then you will pay the experimenter 5.75 Euros to 
play the coin toss lottery with a maximum of 6 tosses and possible outcomes in the first 6 rows of 
Table 1. 
 
